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INTRODUCTION
A.

General.

In this Reply Brief, Appellants seek to address only those issues discussed in Appellee's
principal Brief dated July 31, 2002.
The two main issues of this appeal are (1) parole evidence rule matter and (2) tax sale validity
matter. Appellant believes the tax sale validity matter has been adequately briefed by the parties and
does not require further briefing herein.
Some of the issues referenced in Appellee's Brief appear to be irrelevant to the issues of this
appeal. However, Appellants respond to such issues for purposes of having a complete record for
the appellate court on appeal.
B.

Preservation of Issues on Appeal.

Appellee asserts that Appellants have not indicated how the issues on appeal were preserved
for appeal in the lower court.
Appellants raised, briefed, and argued the contested issues in the lower court, as citations in
Appellants' principal Brief make reference. The issues were preserved on appeal through the timely
filing of a Notice of Appeal on December 5, 2001 - which Notice of Appeal indicated the issues
which were appealed.
ARGUMENT
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS
INAPPROPRIATE IN THE LOWER COURT
A.

Standard of Review.

"Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law [citation omitted].
Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of law, we accord no
deference to the trial court's resolution ofthe legal issues presented [citation omitted].
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable
1

inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party
[citation omitted]." Peterson v. The Sunrider Corporation, 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah
2002); See, also, Goodnow v. Sullivan, 44 P.3d 704, 706 (Utah 2002); Ward v.
Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1995); Harris v.
Albrecht, 46 P.3d 241,242 (Utah App. 2002); Francisconi v. Union Pacific Railroad
Co,, 36 P.3d 999, 1001-1002 (Utah App. 2001); Capital Assets Financial Services
v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah App. 1998); see also Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure 56(c).
B.

Questions of Fact Exist.

In 1985, Zions Bank owned the real property ("Property") subject to this action. The
Property was sold at a tax sale by Utah County in May 1985 [R. Addendum "A" to Appellants'
principal Brief]. At the sale, the Property was purchased for $1,300 by Richard A. Christenson, a
customer of the bank, expressly to protect the bank's interests [R. at 299-301, 314-315, 351].
Mr. Christenson was later reimbursed by the bank [R. at 299-301,314-315,351] and signed
a Quit-Claim Deed (sometimes "Deed") back to the bank [R. Addendum "B" to Appellants' principal
Brief]. The problem of this litigation arises because Mr. Christenson inserted the word "trustee" after
his name on the Deed.1 Fifteen years of real estate transactions relating to the Property followed the
delivery of the Deed, including the subsequent sale by Zions Bank to a company wholly-owned by
Mr. Christenson [R. at 80-81].
It is Appellants' contention that the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was intended by Mr. Christenson
to divest any ownership of title which he claimed in the Property. The Deed is ambiguous because
it is impossible to determine the intended identity of the grantor solelyfromthe Deed which describes
the grantor as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee".

1

It should be noted that Mr. Christenson, not Zions Bank, is believed to have drafted the
1985 Quit-Claim Deed. Writings, of course, may be construed against the draftor of the same in
interpreting the meaning of a document. In cases of ambiguous documents, such a presumption is
not imposed unless a consideration of extrinsic evidence fails to explain the meaning of the ambiguous
document. See Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 63-4 (Utah App. 1994).
2

The lower court ruled, on summary judgment and as a matter of law, that Mr. Christenson
did not divest himself of title to the Property by virtue of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed. Accordingly,
the Court recognized the validity of a 1998 Quit-Claim Deed which Mr. Christenson executed
following his unsuccessfiil attempt in a Salt Lake County lawsuit to acquire title through an unrelated
claim. By so doing, the Court threw out 15 years of real estate transactions relating to the Property
flowing from the earlier 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank.
Summary judgment in favor of Appellee is clearly inappropriate because substantial questions
of fact exist as to the intentions of Mr. Christenson in executing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to Zions
Bank, including:
Who was the intended grantor under the Deed?
What was Mr. Christenson's intention in signing the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed?
Did Mr. Christenson intend to divest himself of fee ownership by deeding the Property back
to Zions Bank?
Why would Mr. Christenson sign a deedfroma trust when title was in his individual name?
Did the "trustee" designation on the Deed resultfromMr. Christenson's understanding that
he had purchased the Property for Zions Bank in a trust or escrow arrangement?
Why didn't Mr. Christenson show the Property on his 1987 Financial Statement if he claimed
to own the same in his individual capacity?
Why did Mr. Christenson apparently recognize the validity of the Deed for 13 years (until
1998) if he never intended to divest himself of title through the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed?
Why did Mr. Christenson never claim fee ownership in the 1996 Salt Lake Lawsuit if he had
intended to retain title to the Property in 1985? Why did such lawsuit seek to foreclose his claimed
lien upon his "own" property if he thought he owned the same?

3

Viewing the facts of this case in the light most favorable to Appellants, it is impossible to
determine as a matter of law that Mr. Christenson did not intend to divest himself of fee title to the
Property when he quit-claimed the Property to Zions Bank in 1985. The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed is
clearly ambiguous, on its face, in the grantor description.
In the context of a motion relying on an ambiguous document, "a motion for summary
judgment may not be granted if a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists and there is a
factual issue as to what the parties intended." (Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah
1991), citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983).) "Where a contract is
ambiguous, summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party, leaves no genuine issues of fact to be resolved". Peterson at 927.

II. PAROLE EVIDENCE IS REQUIRED
TO INTERPRET THE DEED'S
MEANING AND INTENTION
A.

The 1985 Quit-Claim Deed is Ambiguous.

"Deeds are construed according to ordinary rules of contract construction". Homer v. Smith,
866 P.2d 622, 629 (Utah App. 1993); Capital Assets at 1093.
"Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is a question of law". Winegar at 108.
"A contract provision is ambiguous it if is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation
because of 'uncertain meanings of terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies5." Winegar at
108.
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If a contract is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence should be considered to ascertain the intentions
of the parties.2 See Winegar at 108; Faulkner at 1293.
In the case of Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Association, 907 P.2d 264 (Utah 1995), the
Utah Supreme Court expanded the use of the parole evidence rule to require courts to consider
extrinsic evidence in the preliminary determination of whether an instrument is ambiguous. In Ward,
the Supreme Court stated:
"When determining whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence
must be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is inherently onesided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic evidence of the judge's own linguistic
education and experience' [emphasis added; citations omitted]. Although the terms
of an instrument may seem clear to a particular reader - including a judge - this does
not rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the agreement to
express a different meaning. A judge should therefore consider any credible evidence
offered to show the parties' intention [emphasis added].
While there is Utah case law that espouses a stricter application of the [parole
evidence] rule and would restrict a determination of whether ambiguity exists to a
judge's determination of the meaning of the terms of the writing itself, the betterreasoned approach is to consider the writing in the light of the surrounding
circumstances [citations omitted]. Rational interpretation requires at least a
preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the intention of the
parties . . . so that the court can 'place itself in the same situation in which the parties
found themselves at the time of contracting' [emphasis added; citations omitted].
If after considering such evidence the court determines that the interpretations
contended for are reasonably supported by the language of the contract, then extrinsic
evidence is admissible to clarify the ambiguous terms." . . . Conversely, if after
considering such evidence the court determines that the language of the contract is
not ambiguous, then the parties' intentions must be determined solely from the
language of the contract. Ward at 268.
* **

"Indeed, exclusion of such evidence would deny the relevance of the parties'
intentions and defeat the principle of contract interpretation that 'the intentions of the
parties are controlling'." Ward at 268-269.

2

The lower court's formal "Order" (August 24, 2000) made no express written finding
regarding ambiguity, although the court's earlier verbal ruling clearly was based on such premise.
All subsequent pleadings, including Appellants' Motion for Reconsideration [R. at 338] deal with the
lower court's ruling and refusal to consider extrinsic evidence based upon his interpretation of the
parole evidence rule.
5

B.

Mr. Christenson's Intent Can Only be Determined by Examining Parole

Evidence.
Appellants urged the lower court, and urge this Court, to allow extrinsic evidence to explain
the intent of an ambiguous document. The lower court refused to consider anything but the Deed
itself, ruling that the parole evidence rule mandated such a result. The lower court erred because the
1985 Quit-Claim Deed is clearly ambiguous, and extrinsic evidence must be examined under the
guidelines of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court.3
Appellee did not raise the parole evidence rule in its pleadings filed on the summary judgment
motion. The issue was raised, sua sponte, by the lower court at oral argument on the cross-motions
for summary judgment. The lower court did not issue Findings of Fact nor Conclusions of Law in
granting summary judgment. The lower court made no specific finding on the issue of ambiguity of
the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed, although its decision was obviously premised on its interpretation and
understanding of the parole evidence rule. Such ruling ignored the affidavit of an expert witness
indicating that the Deed is ambiguous because it was impossible to determine the intended "grantor"
[R. at 364].
"The intentions of the parties to a contract are controlling, and generally those intentions will
be found in the instrument itself. However, if a writing is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort

3

Appellee argues that the Deed may be ambiguous to determine who the grantor "was", but
that the Deed is not ambiguous as to who the grantor "wasn't" (Mr. Christenson individually). This
argument of "selective ambiguity" is previously unrecognized by Utah appellate courts and seems
contrary to the intent of the parole evidence rule and its "ambiguity" exception. Indeed, such an
argument would require an exception to an exception to the parole evidence rule - requiring courts
to unilaterally determine "degrees" of ambiguity. Such a tortured analysis seems fruitless if one is
really searching for the truth and accurate facts. Further, such an argument clearly runs counter to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Ward "requiring" a court to consider extrinsic evidence to ascertain
whether there is an ambiguity and further allowing consideration of parole evidence in case of a
finding of ambiguity. Appellee, in arguing "selective ambiguity", seems to admit the initial threshold
question of the existence of ambiguity.
6

may be had to extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the parties." C & YCorp. v. General
Biometrics, Inc., 896 P.2d 47, 52 (Utah App. 1995).
"Simply stated, the rule operates, in the absence of invalidating causes such as fraud or
illegality, to exclude evidence of prior or contemporaneous conversations, representations, or
statements offered for the purpose of varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract". Hall
v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 890 P.2d 1024, 1026 (Utah 1995) [emphasis added].
Appellants do not seek to "alter" or "change" the meaning or intention of the Deed. Extrinsic
evidence will simply "explain" or "clarify" the intention of the Deed.
"The Utah Supreme Court has held that in some cases c[p]arole evidence is admissible to
show the purpose and intent of parties to a deed'." Capital Assets at 1094 [citing Bown v. Loveland,
678 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah 1984)].
Or, as expressed by an appellate court in the neighboring state of New Mexico:
"Extrinsic evidence is admissible to establish that the deed did not express the true
agreement of the parties, even if the inconsistency cannot be detected on the face of
the deed and becomes clear only in light of surrounding circumstances. Twin Forks
Ranch, Inc. v. Brooks, 907 P.2d 1013, 1016 (N.M. App. 1995) (citations omitted].
C.

Contract Interpretation Favors Consistent Construction of Documents.

To interpret a deed against the history of prior ownership is inconsistent and unreasonable.
The Utah Supreme Court has said:
"... we interpret the terms of a contract in light of the reasonable expectations of the
parties, looking to the agreement as a whole and to the circumstances, nature and
purpose of the contract". Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 2000) [citations
omitted].
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m. PROFFERED PAROLE EVIDENCE WAS
REFUSED BY THE LOWER COURT.
Appellee asserts that Appellants have failed to proffer any credible evidence to support the
assertion that Mr. Christenson intended to divest his fee title to the property by virtue of the 1985
Quit-Claim Deed to Zions Bank.
The following evidence was proffered to the lower court:
1.

In three separate depositions taken in other cases, Mr. Christenson testified that he

was reimbursed by Zions Bank for the back taxes fronted by Mr. Christenson and that he then deeded
the Property back to the bank - conclusively proving his intent when signing the 1985 Quit-Claim
Deed [R. at 299-300, 314-315, 351].
2.

Mr. Christenson has a history of holding properties in the names of trusts he has

established - explaining why he routinely signed deeds "Richard Christenson, Trustee" [R. at
300-301,316].
3.

Mr. Christenson'sfinancialstatements of the time immediately after the 1985 Quit-

Claim Deed to Zions Bank do not list the Property as a personal asset - illustrating his intent that the
Deed divested himself of any personal ownership to the Property [R. at 302-3, 318].
4.

Mr. Christenson filed a lawsuit in Salt Lake County in March of 1996, asserting a

"lien" against the Property arising out of a 1978 transaction - at no time during the four years of the
litigation did Mr. Christenson assert any claim to fee ownership of the Property - confirming that he
intended the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to transfer any individual claim to title [R. at 300].
5.

Mr. Christenson's subsequent dealings with the Property after 1985 through

acquisition of titlefromZions Bank - evidencing his understanding and intention that the 1985 QuitClaim Deed to the bank was effective to transfer his individual interest to the Property. [The lower
court refused a tender of such transactional documents at oral argument]
8

6.

Mr. Christenson' s 1998 transfer of the Property by Quit-Claim Deed to a corporation

owned or controlled by his neighbor, Chuck Akerlow (the gentleman who financed the earlier,
unsuccessful litigation in Salt Lake County) - illustrating that the 1998 Deed to Appellee was a
manufactured attempt to resurrect a claim to acquire the now valuable property.
Furthermore, the summary judgment Order was granted despite Appellants' concurrent
Rule 54(b) request for additional time to take depositions [R. at 88-89,138] - the lower court ruling
that additional depositions could not produce any evidence which would not be excluded under the
parole evidence rule in any event [R. Addendum "F" to Appellants' principal Brief]. Accordingly,
Appellants had little opportunity to proffer extrinsic evidence as to the intended grantor, nor
undertake discovery designed to clear up the ambiguity under the Deed itself
The lower court refused to consider any of the foregoing evidence (all of which seems clear
to illustrate Mr. Christenson's intent that the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed transferred all of his individual
interest in the Property to Zions Bank). The lower court, in its decision, expressed fear that it "might
be helping someone perpetuate afraud"[R. at 759], but ruled that the parole evidence rule prohibited
it from considering extrinsic evidence. The court's concern in struggling to find the truth, while
following its perception of the law, illustrated the fear of a North Dakota court which once said:
"If parol evidence were not admissible to show intent or mistake in an action to
reform a contract, the parol evidence rule would be rendered an instrument of the very
mistake it was intended to prevent". Ell v. Ell, 295 N.W.2d 143, 150 (N.D. 1980).
To refuse to consider parole evidence on the intention of an ambiguous deed would create
the very problem the parole evidence rule was intended to prevent.
This Court shouldfindthat the lower court erred in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence
- first to determine whether the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed was ambiguous and, secondly, to explain the
intentions of the parties in relation to the Deed.
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IV. APPELLANTS' ROOT OF TITLE IS
IRRELEVANT AND INAPPROPRIATE TO
THE ISSUES BEFORE THIS COURT.
A.

Appellee's Raising of This Issue is Untimely.

Appellee raises on appeal the issue that Appellant's 1993 Deed to the Property may also be
defective. Appellant raises such issue for thefirsttime in its principal Brief on Appeal. Such issue
was not raised, and certainly not briefed, in the lower court and should not be at issue on this appeal.
"As a general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."
Peterson at 928.
"Where a party neither raises an issue in its pleadings nor presents it to the trial court, the
issue cannot be considered for the first time on appeal." Park City Utah Corporation v. Ensign
Company, 586 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1978).
"However, because this issue was raised for thefirsttime on appeal and was not adequately
briefed, we decline to address it." Viktron/Lika v. Labor Commission, 38 P.3d 993, 996 (Utah App.
2001).4
B.

The Issue is Irrelevant.

Any argument asserting a defect in Appellants' title is totally irrelevant to the question of the
meaning of the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed from Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank. If the lower court's
ruling is upheld, Appellants' 1993 Deed is presumably invalid already. If the lower court's ruling is
reversed and upheld in the subsequent lower court ruling, Appellee wouldn't have further standing
to complain about Appellants' root of title. Presumably, Appellee could raise the issue, if needed,
on remand.

4

Appellee likewise raises the issue on appeal for thefirsttime that the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed
may be "void" as a result of a defective "grantor" description. Such issue was neither raised nor brief
in the lower court.
10

C

In Any Event, the Assertion is Wrong.

Appellee's assertion is wrong anyway. The 1993 version of the foreclosure statute - cited
by Appellee - allows a trustee's sale to be held "at the courthouse of the county in which the property
to be sold, or some part thereof, is situated" [see § 57-1-25(2) of the Utah Code Annotated]. The
quoted statute does not require two sales when foreclosing a parcel of property located in two
adjacent properties. The statute clearly provides that "the sale" can be held at either county
courthouse. The vast majority of the property subject to the trustee's sale by which Appellants
acquired the Property (substantial additional property was included which is not part of the Property
on appeal) [see Addendum "D" to Appellants' principal Brief] was located in Salt Lake County.

CONCLUSION
Appellants respectfully seek an Orderfromthis Court finding:
1.

That the lower court erred in granting Summary Judgment in favor of Appellees

because there exist substantial genuine issues of material fact. For an Order of this Court reversing
the lower court's Order of summary judgment dated August 24, 2000.
2.

That the lower court erred in refusing to allow introduction and consideration of

parole evidence to explain the intent of an ambiguous grantor designation in a deed. This case should
be remanded back to the lower court with instructions to require introduction and consideration of
evidence to determine the intent of Mr. Christenson with respect to the 1985 Quit-Claim Deed to
Zions Bank.
3.

That the lower court erred in determining that the tax sale by Utah County of Salt

Lake County property was not jurisdictionally invalid because it was not a sale held "in the course
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of a statutory proceeding". This Court should hold, as a matter of law, that the sale of property
located in Salt Lake County was void.
4.

Alternatively, and in any event, that the lower court erred in refusing to find that the

1984 Tax Deed from Utah County was limited by its express terms to property located in Utah
County. This Court should hold, as a matter of law, that the Deed was ineffective to transfer any
property located in Salt Lake County.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %

day of August, 2002.

NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN

Bru^e J. Nelson, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants Uwe Michel and
Ullrich Michel
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